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Whren’s Flawed Assumptions
Regarding Race, History, and
Unconscious Bias


William M. Carter, Jr.†
My heartfelt thanks to CWRU Law School and the Law Review for
having me here. I am an alumnus of CWRU Law, a former faculty
member here from 2001–07, and a native Clevelander, so it’s always
nice to be back home.
This symposium marks the 20th anniversary of Whren,1 which happens to coincide with the 20th anniversary of my first year of law school
here in this building. Shortly before I entered law school in the spring
of 1995, Adarand v. Pena2 was decided. I had come to law school with
very idealistic notions about race, social justice, and criminal law: it’s
fair to say that Adarand and Whren bracketing my 1L year was a dash
of cold water about the law’s—and the Court’s—willingness to grapple
with persistent racial inequality in a forthright or effective manner.
My 1L year here began with, on the one hand, Adarand, which by
applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action devalued the existence of
structural inequalities that might permit the government to intervene
in order to create a level playing field.3 On the other hand, at the end
of my first year of law school, the Whren decision was issued, which,
by allowing pretextual searches and seizures even if racially motivated,
devalued the lived experiences of people of color and gave license to
racial profiling, at least as far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned.4


The following is adapted from the Whren at Twenty Symposium Panel IV:
Alternative Routes, New Solutions, and New Definitions of the Problem
on October 23, 2016, at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.

†

William M. Carter, Jr. is Dean and Professor of Law at the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law. Dean Carter received his J.D., magna cum laude
and Order of the Coif, from the Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. Upon graduation from law school, he worked as a litigation associate
in the Washington, D.C. offices of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey and Ropes
& Gray. From 2001-2007, Dean Carter was a Professor of Law at the Case
Western Reserve University Law School. From 2007-2012, Dean Carter was
a Professor of Law at the Temple University Beasley School of Law.

1.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).

2.

515 U.S. 200 (1995). Adarand was argued on January 17, 1995 and decided
June 12, 1995. Id. at 200.

3.

Id. at 227.

4.

See Whren, 517 U.S. at 819 (holding that “probable cause to believe that
petitioners had violated the traffic code” justified a stop, even if the actual
reason for the stop was based on the driver’s race).
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Thus, in addition to being an important jurisprudential anniversary,
the Whren decision is also an intellectual anniversary for me personally
as I reflect upon how the decision shaped my view of these issues both
as a practitioner and then subsequently as an academic.
I want to talk very briefly about some of the flaws in Whren as a
matter of constitutional history, doctrine, and social psychology. Those
issues have been discussed throughout this symposium,5 so I will only
touch upon them briefly. I will then discuss some legal developments in
equal protection doctrine post-Whren. Finally, I will suggest a possible
path forward. A great deal of my scholarship over the years has been
in the field of the Thirteenth Amendment.6 I will, therefore, suggest
that we can reconceptualize racially motivated, pretextual police encounters as a Thirteenth Amendment issue rather than as either a
Fourth Amendment issue or a Fourteenth Amendment issue.
First, as to Whren itself: it is very striking that there is not a single
word in Whren specifically referencing the founding history or the
Reconstruction Amendments’ Framers’ intent with regard to whether
pretextual searches or seizures would have been considered “reasonable.” To be sure, the Whren opinion relied largely upon its interpretation of the Court’s earlier precedents; accordingly, the Court may not
have found it necessary to engage in a lengthy historical exegesis in
order to justify the result that it reached.7 Nonetheless, there is significant reason to question whether the Framers and the Colonial citizenry
that respectively wrote and ratified the original Constitution would
have believed that the Fourth Amendment placed no restraints upon
governmental officials’ ability to carry out roving searches and seizures
based upon the merest pretext, given their own experiences with the
colonial forces of the British Crown in this regard.8 Further, there is
5.

Lewis R. Katz, Introduction to Whren at Twenty: Systemic Racial Bias and
the Criminal Justice System, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 923 (2016).

6.

See e.g., William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment:
Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1311
(2007) [hereinafter Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment] (interpreting
the meaning of badges and incidents of slavery); William M. Carter, Jr., The
Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the Badges and Incidents
of Slavery, 71 Md. L. Rev. 21 (2011) (examining the scope of the Thirteenth
Amendment).

7.

Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–19.

8.

See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
Mich. L. Rev. 547 (1999) (describing the Founders’ conceptions of the Fourth
Amendment); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand.
L. Rev. 333, 333–38 (1998) (“white colonists rightfully protested that certain
British search and seizure practices conferred ‘a power that places the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty officer’” (and noting the contradiction
that many of these same colonists condoned equally arbitrary searches and

948

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016
Whren's Flawed Assumptions Regarding Race, History,
and Unconscious Bias

ample evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers specifically
considered race-based pretextual searches and seizures to be violative
of the “new birth of freedom”9 that the Reconstruction Amendments
were designed to bring about, since such searches, seizures, and other
restraints on blacks’ freedom of movement were key aspects of slavery
and the legalized white supremacy that slavery both engendered and
relied upon.10
It is also worth noting how Whren fits within the Court’s broader
equal protection doctrine regarding the role of motive in constitutional
analysis. Whren holds that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”11 Thus, under the
Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Whren, subjective motive is irrelevant to the assessment of whether the government’s action is constitutional. On the other hand, the Court’s equal protection doctrine has
simultaneously placed increasing (indeed, determinative) emphasis on
the relevance of motive in cases where plaintiffs have sought to advance
the interests of racial minorities, such that proof of subjective discriminatory motive is now the sine qua non of equal protection claims.12 Read
seizures of blacks, both slave and free)). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757 (1994) (discussing
Founders’ intent regarding the Fourth Amendment).
9.

President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).

10.

See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (stating that the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibited the “inseparable incidents of the institution” of
slavery that were imposed upon blacks, such as “restraint of [their] movements”). During the congressional debates regarding the Thirteenth Amendment, its proponents similarly described state-imposed or state-sanctioned
restraints on blacks’ freedom of movement as among the badges and incidents
of slavery that the Amendment would abolish. Senator Lyman Trumbull of
Illinois, for example, argued during the Thirteenth Amendment debates, that
“[i]t is idle to say that a man is free who cannot go and come at pleasure.”
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1866), cited in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 430 (1967). Senator Trumbull also noted, shortly
after the Amendment was passed, that the Thirteenth Amendment abolished
provisions of the states’ Black Codes that restrained African Americans’
freedom of movement. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866).

11.

Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.

12.

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that, absent proof
of discriminatory purpose, even a substantial racially disparate impact “does
not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations”) (citation
omitted); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (holding, in a case alleging
racial and religious discrimination, that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient
factual specificity in his complaint regarding the defendant’s subjective state
of mind to make his claim sufficiently “plausible” to survive a motion to
dismiss). See also Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 Va.
L. Rev. 951, 1013 (2002) (“Current doctrine requires plaintiffs challenging
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together, the Court’s doctrine seems to be that the role of motive in
constitutional analysis turns upon how it will affect the outcome. That
is: if disallowing proof of motive means that claims advocating the interests of racial minorities will fail, then proof of motive is deemed
irrelevant;13 if requiring proof of motive means that claims advocating
the interests of racial minorities will fail, then proof of motive is deemed
required.14 A skeptical observer could conclude that that’s a doctrine of
convenience rather than of principle.
Moreover, Whren is particularly troubling in giving no attention to
issues of social psychology, unconscious bias, and the historically grounded implicit associations between race and widespread stereotypes regarding propensity for criminality.15 Combining the essentially unfettered discretion to conduct pretextual searches and seizures that Whren
licenses with what we know about the history and psychology of the
conflation of race and criminality, one is left to wonder: what did the
Court think was going to happen post-Whren? The Court could not be
surprised that Whren would predictably lead to an increase in racial
profiling and increasing tension in police-community relations.16 To be
clear, the problem is not necessarily that any individual law enforcement officer consciously singles out people of color due to his or her
personal animus against them. I do not assume that police officers are
racist; I do believe, however, that in the absence of proactive training
and interventions, they are no more immune to unconscious bias than
the rest of us.
To be sure, the Whren opinion gives a brief nod in the direction of
these concerns in two lines that appear at the end of the opinion: “We
of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective
enforcement of the law based on consideration such as race. But the
neutral laws or policies with a disparate impact to prove illicit motive . . . .”);
Gordon G. Young, Justifying Motive Analysis in Judicial Review, 17 Wm.
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 191 (2008) (discussing the use of motive, in part, in
equal protection law).
13.

See, e.g., Whren, 517 U.S. 806.

14.

See, e.g., Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009).

15.

See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 17, 56-60 (2004)
and authorities cited therein (discussing these issues in detail).

16.

See e.g., David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why
“Driving While Black” Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1999) (discussing
the implications of racially motivated pretextual traffic stops); see also
Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling
and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 651 (2002)
(discussing the use of racial profiling in stops and searches).
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constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of the laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”17 Because Whren appeared to open the door to equal protection claims, litigants quickly began invoking the Equal Protection Clause
in cases involving alleged racial profiling. Courts generally have not,
however, been receptive to such claims post-Whren.18
In United States v. Avery,19 for example, the defendant moved to
suppress evidence of cocaine that was found in his carry-on luggage,
arguing that he had been singled out for surveillance and subsequently
searched because of his race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The officers testified at trial that Avery drew their attention for several
reasons: he appeared to be very focused in trying to get to his seat on
the plane; he appeared to be very anxious and in a hurry to board the
airplane; he was the first passenger to get on the plane; and he had
purchased a one-way ticket with cash shortly before departure.20 Avery
was detained, and the police seized his carry-on bag, which was later
found to contain cocaine.21

17.

Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.

18.

See e.g., Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that the
plaintiff failed to prove discriminatory effect where she did not submit any
statistical evidence of bias); Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th
Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant because
plaintiffs failed to prove the prime facie elements of an equal protection claim);
United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997); Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d
245, 248–49 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendant officer because the plaintiff could not point to evidence showing
that the officer’s sole motivation in making the stop was the plaintiff’s race);
United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 173–74 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Harvey, 16 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jennings, 985 F.2d 562
(6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 578 (6th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating, in a preWhren Fourth Amendment case, “[w]e would not hesitate to hold that a solely
race-based suspicion of drug courier status would not pass constitutional muster.
Accordingly, had [the officer] relied solely upon the fact of Weaver’s race as a
basis for his suspicions, we would have a different case before us.” (emphasis
added)); Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State H’way Patrol, 95 F. Supp. 2d
723, 733–34 (N.D. Ohio 2000). But see Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that city officials demonstrated deliberate
indifference to equal protection violations) (remanded and reassigned for other
reasons in Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118 (2013)); Giron v. City of
Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Arkansas 2010) (holding that police officers
intentionally and purposefully targeted Hispanic motorists in traffic stops in
violation of equal protection).

19.

137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997).

20.

Id. at 346.

21.

Id. at 347.
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At trial, one of the officers testified that Avery met several elements
of a narcotics trafficking profile. Crucially, although the officer said he
had never been formally taught to use race as an element of such a
profile, he admitted on the stand that the understanding among officers
was to look for black or Jamaican gang members who used young white
women as drug couriers.22 In addition to this testimony regarding the
influence of race on the officers’ decision-making, defendant Avery also
presented statistical evidence that he argued raised an inference of a
discriminatory motive in the decision to stop and search him.23
Despite the explicit (and highly unusual) admission in open court
that race influenced the officers’ decisions regarding who to stop and
search and the statistical evidence of broader racial disparities, the
Sixth Circuit nonetheless rejected Avery’s equal protection argument.24
The court acknowledged Whren’s statement that claims of selective
race-based law enforcement would trigger an equal protection (rather
than Fourth Amendment) inquiry, and held that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides citizens a degree of
protection independent of the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”25 The Avery court further held,
however, that in this context, the decision to investigate Mr. Avery was
not based solely on racial considerations.26 Accordingly, under this “sole
motive” standard, Avery’s claim failed.
This “sole motive” standard, which has been cited favorably and
applied by numerous other lower courts post-Avery in cases alleging
racial profiling, is both nearly impossible to meet and represents an
incorrect application of standard equal protection doctrine.27 As to the
first point: in Avery itself, the court rejected the equal protection argument because the defendant could not prove that the only reason that
22.

Id. Note that if the officers were actually following the “informal” profile factor,
it would have made little sense to search Mr. Avery: rather, they would have
tended to search young white women (the most likely drug couriers in this
context, according to the officer’s testimony), not black men.

23.

Id. at 356.

24.

Id. at 358.

25.

Id. at 352.

26.

Id. at 358.

27.

See United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995) (“We have no
need to reach [the question of whether the exclusionary rule applies to Fourteenth Amendment violations] because the detectives in this case did not
choose to interview the defendant solely because of her race.”). Brown v. City
of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 338 (2d Cir. 1999) (“As the police therefore are
not alleged to have investigated ‘based solely upon . . . race, without more,’
plaintiffs have failed to state an actionable claim under the Equal Protection
Clause.”) (cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 44 (2001)).

952

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016
Whren's Flawed Assumptions Regarding Race, History,
and Unconscious Bias

he was stopped and searched was because of his race.28 There were multiple factors, one of which was explicitly racial.29 Despite the admitted
fact that race infected the overall investigatory process, because Avery
did not prove that race was the sole motive for this encounter, his equal
protection challenge failed.30
As to the second point: The “sole motive” analysis is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s “mixed-motive” analysis equal protection
cases. The Court has squarely held that the Equal Protection Clause,
while requiring proof of discriminatory motive in order to trigger strict
scrutiny,31 “does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged
action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes.”32 Thus, once
race is found to be a substantial motivating factor, the burden shifts to
the government to show that it would have made the same decision
absent the racial factor.33 If it cannot make that showing, strict scrutiny
is triggered and the government action would be presumptively unconstitutional.34 The Avery court, and later courts that have applied the
“sole motive” analysis in racial profiling cases, have, instead of applying
the preceding analytical framework, simply found that race was not the
sole motive for the search or seizure—which it would never be in a
profiling case: a “profile” is by definition multifactoral—and that, therefore, the claimant loses.35

28.

Avery, 137 F.3d at 353–54, 358.

29.

See supra text accompanying notes 22–23 (describing the drug profile factors
at issue in Avery).

30.

More specifically, the court held that Mr. Avery had not proven that racial
considerations were the sole motive for the officers’ decision to investigate
him. In other words, he did not foreclose the possibility that, despite officers’
admittedly applying the “informal” racial factor in stopping and searching
other travelers, they may decided to stop and search him anyway for other,
nonracial reasons. Avery, 137 F.3d at 347, 358.

31.

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).

32.

Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977)
(emphasis added).

33.

Id. at 270 n.21.

34.

Id.

35.

See U.S. v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 356–58 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that statistical
evidence of disparate impact can be used only to create a “rebuttable, prima
facie case” of race being a motivating factor, but finding Avery’s statistical
evidence unpersuasive, particularly because the lower court found many
reasons why Avery was stopped, independent of race; see also United States
v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Avery in support of sole
motive analysis); Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337–38 (2d Cir.
1999) (same).
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Whren’s promise of serious equal protection review of racially motivated pretextual searches and seizures has therefore proved hollow. I
have written elsewhere that a shift toward viewing racial profiling through the different constitutional lens of the Thirteenth Amendment is,
therefore, more likely to take account of the historical, sociological, and
psychological factors that can lead to racial profiling.36 The following
will show how the Thirteenth Amendment can address these issues in
ways that the Fourth Amendment and the equal protection doctrine as
currently construed do not.
The Thirteenth Amendment textually speaks of forbidding slavery
and involuntary servitude,37 but its Framers repeatedly expressed their
intention that the Amendment would go further than abolishing unpaid
labor.38 According to its Framers, the Thirteenth Amendment would
also abolish “all badges and incidents of slavery”: those laws, customs,
and lingering vestiges of slavery that were part of the slave power and
that had supported it.39 Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, for example, in speaking of the Amendment’s scope as authority for the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, stated:
With the destruction of slavery necessarily follows the destruction
of the incidents to slavery. When slavery was abolished, slave
codes in its support were abolished also.
Those laws that prevented the colored man going from home, that
did not allow him to buy or to sell, or to make contracts; that did
not allow him to own property; that did not allow him to enforce
rights; that did not allow him to be educated, were all badges of
servitude made in the interest of slavery and as a part of slavery.
They never would have been thought of or enacted anywhere but
for slavery, and when slavery falls they fall also.40

In addition to listing such catalogs of the specific vestiges of the
slave system, the Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers frequently spoke
even more broadly about the Amendment’s purpose as destroying the
entirety of the slave power’s legacy, wherever and in whatever form it
was found to persist. Representative Myers of Pennsylvania, for example, arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment provided congressional
power to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866, stated:
36.

See Carter, supra note 34.

37.

U.S. Const. amend. XIII.

38.

See Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1330–35
(analyzing the Framers’ vision of the Thirteenth Amendment).

39.

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).

40.

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866).
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The great change of which I have spoken is that from slavery to
freedom. Slavery gone, its laws, its prejudices, and consequences
should be buried forever. We are legislating for mankind. If there
be wrong, now is the time to right it; if there be defects, this is
the forum in which to remedy them; if doubts remain, the present
is the hour to solve them. The craven may shift the responsibility,
but civilization will hold us accountable for the performance of
our whole duty.41

I believe that racial profiling amounts to a badge or incident
of slavery and that the Thirteenth Amendment therefore provides a
constitutional remedy for it. There are at least three reasons for viewing
race-based policing as a Thirteenth Amendment issue.
First, in a very literal sense, such stops amount to a race-based
restraint on freedom of movement. The widespread use of race-based
pretextual searches and seizures results in significant limitations on the
ability of persons of color to come and go as they please without statesanctioned limitations on their physical freedom of movement based
(even in part) upon their race.42
Second, in a broader sense, the historical association of blackness
with criminality is, as noted earlier, part of the legacy of slavery and
white supremacy that which we have all absorbed. To the extent that
we give law enforcement officials wide discretion to utilize pretextual
stops, those stops will be based upon hunches and intuition, which are
in turn influenced by the centuries-long legacy of racial bias that they
(and we all) have internalized.43 In determining when to utilize a pretextual stop, officers must make judgments: as between the hundreds of
citizens they encounter each day who commit nominal traffic infractions
(which are impossible to avoid if one drives for any length of time) or
quality of life offenses (e.g., littering), which ones to stop? The officer’s
judgment will be informed by whom he or she believes is likely to be
engaging in some additional more serious offense for which the traffic
infraction or quality of life offense provides an investigative pretext, as
is licensed by Whren. It is unlikely that law enforcement officials are
immune from cultural biases that one’s status as a racial minority is

41.

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1622 (1866). See generally Race, Rights,
and the Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 6 (discussing extensively the
Amendment’s intent and purposes).

42.

Becca James, Stop and Frisk in 4 Cities: The Importance of Open Police
Data, Sunlight Found. (Mar. 2, 2015, 9:00 AM) https://sunlightfoundation.
com/blog/2015/03/02/stop-and-frisk-in-4-cities-the-importance-of-open-policedata-2/ [https://perma.cc/9Z3S-AG98] (noting stop and frisk data from four
cities raises concerns that the stops are motivated by racial biases).

43.

See supra note 15 (citing articles about unconscious bias and associations
between race and criminality).
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probative of her propensity to engage in crime; thus, the officer’s intuition regarding who to stop and search will be influenced by unconscious
and implicit biases deriving from centuries of slavery and racial stereotyping. This sort of state-sanctioned stigmatization was considered by
the Framers to be among the badges and incidents of slavery that the
Thirteenth Amendment would abolish.
The final benefit of a Thirteenth Amendment approach to the issues
to which Whren gives short shrift is that the Thirteenth Amendment,
by its very language and context, requires an understanding of and a
candid jurisprudential dialogue about race, racism, and history. Thus,
even if a particular claim based upon a badges and incidents of slavery
theory ultimately proves unsuccessful, at least the claimant will have
shaped the case in a way that is resonant with her lived experiences.
Cases involving race-based pretextual stops are not just about abstract
legal doctrine: they are, to the claimants and others similarly situated,
just as much about the ability of persons of color to walk the streets
and drive the roads of their country without wondering whether their
ability to do so freely depends upon the color of their skin.
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